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ERROR AND THREAT DETECTION: A REVIEWAND EVALUATION OF CURRENT LITERATURE 
Christina Frederick-Recascino and Michael Gosiewski 
ABSTRACT 
The present project provides a comprehensive review of the literature related to threat and error detection. 
Although there are current models for understanding the concepts of error and threat, little is known about how 
individuals detect errors and threats when they occur. Awareness of error and threat is crucial for advancement of 
safety in the aviation domain. Four areas were discussed related to error and threat detection. First, the general error 
and threat detection literature was reviewed. Second, the physiological foundations for error and threat detection were 
discussed. Third, the paper examined cognitive aspects of error and threat detection. Last, the paper elaborated on the 
role emotion may play in threat detection. The review concludes with suggestions for error and threat management 
and courses of action that can be taken within the aviation domain to train individuals in error and threat detection. 
A primary goal of aviation is to ensure passenger 
safety. One means by which safety has been enhanced is 
through the use of the Line Oriented Safety Audit (LOSA). 
LOSA is a fundamentally new process that monitors cockpit 
behavior of pilots and identifies those actions that are made 
in error (Maurino, 2002). LOSA deviates fiom traditional 
CRM or flight checks in that it is assumed that error can and 
does occur in the cockpit on a daily basis. Most errors are 
minute and therefore unimportant to the overall safety of the 
flight. However, a combination of small errors may occur 
causing a more serious safety incident. Currently the LOSA 
system of error observation and review has been tested in a 
small number of different airlines and the procedure 
continues to develop. In order for the LOSA system to 
progress and its use become more widespread, it is 
important to have a complete understanding of the process 
by which errors and threats in the cockpit can be detected 
and dealt with in order to ensure flight safety. The present 
paper addresses the topic of error and threat detection. It will 
focus attention on the process by which detection occurs, 
incorporating knowledge fiom cognitive psychology and 
physiological psychology. 
Defiitions of Threat and Error 
A great deal of attention has been paid to creation 
of a taxonomy for understanding error. Dorner & Sachaub 
(1 994) and Wehner & Stadler (1 994) argue that human error 
is an innate part of the human cognitive system. Dorner and 
Schaub link error to flaws in information processing that 
include the tendency for humans to forget information, our 
fear of being viewed as incompetence, and our inability to 
manage all the facets of complex systems in a dynamic 
environment. Wehner & Stadler attribute human error to 
fundamental flaws and biases in human perceptual 
processing, as articulated through Gestalt theories of 
processing. Using a more social-cognitive h e w o r k ,  Kroll 
& Ford (1992) link human error to failures in motivation. 
Although the underlying causes of human error 
may be diverse, Maurino, Reason, Johnson & Lee (2002) 
present a comprehensive system for classieing errors using 
the concepts of slips, lapses and mistakes. First, their model 
indicates that all errors are unintentional, however they 
occur for different reasons in different situations. Slips are 
inappropriate actions taken during times when the actor is 
engaged in well-practiced, well-learned tasks. Slips can be 
based in lack of attention, a failure of memory, or a 
misinterpretation of perceptual information. An example of 
a slip is when a pilot accustomed to landing on a specific 
runway during a familiar flight, fails to land on a different 
runway even when clear air traffic commands have directed 
him to the new runway. Lapses, on the other hand, occur 
when the actor fails to perform a necessary action. An 
example of a lapse may be when one is baking a cake and 
forgets to put sugar in the recipe, or omits a necessary action 
fiom a pre-flight checklist. 
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Maurino et al. (1995) also consider the case of 
mistakes. Although the errors they may create are 
unintentional, mistakes involve intentional actions. Mistakes 
occur when, through lack of knowledge or understanding, 
the actor chooses the wrong course of action or applies the 
wrong rules to solve a problem. For example, a pilot may 
respond to a cockpit alarm by performing the wrong 
checklist, even though helshe believes it to be correct. 
Dorner & Schaub (1994) used Reason's (1990) 
model of understanding error and applied it to mistakes 
made in complex domains. Dorner & Schaub argue that 
there are six different components of the action regulation 
system and that mistakes can and do occur in each phase of 
the process. The fmt step in the system is goal regulation. 
Errors made at this level of the system involve either a lack 
of attention paid to initial goal elaboration, or an inability to 
recognize competing goals within the system and one's 
inability to reconcile all potential system needs. The second 
step in the action regulation system involves the collection 
of information and creation of hypotheses used to help 
define future behavior and decision-making. In the second 
step of action regulation, what Domer and Schaub refer to 
as "channeling errors" are likely to occur. This type of error 
is defined by the inability to develop a complete and 
accurate decision-making model, exacerbated by the human 
confirmatory bias, whereby we focus on information that 
confirms what we already know or believe. 
The third stage in action regulation is prognoses, in 
which we are asked to extrapolate our actions into the 
future, basing this projection on past and current 
occurrences. Dorner and Schaub indicate that humans are 
poor prognosticators due to our limited memory abilities. 
We often forget the past and can not use it to accurately 
judge the future. When change is not linear or occurs 
quickly, our relatively poor prediction abilities decline even 
further. The fourth step in action regulation is planning for 
action. In complex systems we use the information we have 
in memory to determine which actions need to occur. 
Mistakes made at this step in the process often involve the 
inability to recognize the side effects or long term 
consequences of our actions. In complex systems this is a 
grave concern. An action taken early on in a situation may 
cause unforeseen consequences hours or days later. These 
potential consequences lead to the fifth step in the action 
regulation system, namely monitoring the effects of our 
actions. In complex systems, the direct and indirect 
consequences of actions may occur days, weeks, months or 
years later. This delay creates a "deadtime" that needs to be 
monitored. Humans, however have limited attention spans 
and often just forget to monitor the system for longterm 
effects. Last, at the end of Domer and Schaub's (1994), 
regulation cycle, humans optimally engage in intensive self- 
reflection about their actions. However, again humans often 
neglect to critically examine their decisions and actions due 
to fear of repercussions or the desire to avoid feeling 
incompetent. However, a lack of self-reflection leads to 
fostering further incompetence in the future. 
Sarter and Alexander (2000) used the Maurino et 
al. fiamework to analyze aviation-based errors as compiled 
using Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident 
reports. Of the 245 ASRS incidents that were examined in 
the study, 20.1 % were classified as slips, 4 1.4% were lapses 
and 38.5% were mistakes. The most frequently occuning 
aviation errors tended to be altitude deviations (35.9%), 
heading or course deviations (32.2%) and runway incursions 
(10.2%). 
In contrast to errors, threats imply recognizable 
hazards that are perceived as serious and must be 
ameliorated effectively and swiftly (Kinney, 1996). 
Furthermore, threats can be classified as either direct or 
conditional. Direct threats are threats that are clearly defined 
and whose consequences are known. For example, loss of 
hydraulic power is a direct threat to the safety of the flight. 
Conditional threats are those which involve a set or series of 
actions and whose consequences are only determined by that 
set of actions. Conditional threats include "if' statements, 
such as "if I lose the right engine, then there will be a threat 
to passenger safety." When the conditional action does not 
occur, the threat ceases to exist. 
Errors and threats exist in relationship to one 
another. While errors may be small, undetected, isolated 
incidents that may or may not affect the overall health of a 
flight, Reason (1990) and Maurino, et al. (1995) provide a 
framework for understanding how errors may evolve into 
threats. It is proposed that errors can accumulate under local 
working conditions, at the same time existing defenses and 
safeguards may break down or fail. When these two 
conditions occur, an accident trajectory is created, which 
can culminate in a critical safety incident. While errors 
alone may not create accidents or unsafe conditions, the 
accumulation of errors can create dangerous situations. The 
awareness of this fact and the recognition of the need for 
immediate action can be labeled as a threat. 
Threot and Error Detection 
Regardless of what we know about the 
classification of errors and how they combine to create a 
threatening event, much less is known about the detection of 
errors and threats. Sellen (1994) defines error detection as 
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"knowing (either consciously or subconsciously) that an 
error has occurred" (p. 476). Following detection the actor 
may also engage in error identification and error recovery. 
For the purposes of this paper, we will concentrate on the 
identification process. In addition to elaborating on the error 
identification process, we will focus on the concept of threat 
d&ection. Threat detection differs from simple error 
detection in that threat detection is associated with a 
negative emotional valence and in some cases with 
potentially disastrous consequences (Kinney, 1996). 
The detection of errors and threats is crucial to 
aviation safety. As mentioned earlier, errors are believed to 
occur in all cockpit operations. It is only when errors 
multiply, are recognized, and are determined to be a threat 
to safety that a serious problem results. Although 
conceptualization of error has a fairly lengthy literature 
associated with it, the error detection literature is less 
articulated and is quite complex. A general overview of this 
process will follow with detailed analysis of the 
physiological, emotional and cognitive elements included in 
later sections of the paper. 
A general view of error detection. How and when 
do humans detect errors in their actions? Error detection is 
a complex phenomenon requiring that the information 
processing, emotional processing and physiological systems 
of humans work together to detect errors that have escalated 
to a level of threat in the environment. In general, however, 
some simple conclusions can be drawn about error detection 
based on prior literatwe. First, it appears that error detection 
is contingent upon level of expertise and development of 
domain-specific declarative knowledge (Blandin & Proteau, 
2000; Ohlsson, 1996). Thus the more expertise one has, the 
more likely one is to recognize that an error has occurred. 
This would also imply that over time, with domain-specific 
experience and practice, most individuals would become 
more skilled at error detection and recovery. Domer & 
Schaub (1 994) support this conclusion and state that the best 
way to detect errors is through training in which individuals 
develop knowledge by being confronted with any errors 
they have committed. LOSA is an example of a review and 
training program that utilizes this premise. Second, there is 
evidence that motivation plays a role in error detection 
(Kroll & Ford, 1992). Individuals with high task-orientation, 
a motivational state in which task engagement is strong, do 
better at recognizing errors than individuals with a more 
ego-based orientation. An ego orientation is reflective of a 
motivational style that is competitive and outcome-oriented, 
rather than the process-based task orientation. 
A limited amount of research has examined 
general error detection processing. Sellen (1 994) examined 
detection of everyday errors in a sample of 75 individuals. 
In Sellen's study, participants kept daily diaries participants 
that detailed their errors and how they became aware of 
them. Sellen was able to create a framework for classifying 
error detection. In action-based detection, errors are caught 
due to the perceptual system detecting the error. In most 
cases the visual system perceives (sees) the error, bat 
detection can also be auditory, or proprioceptive. In 
aviation, alarms and warning lights alert the pilot to the error 
and it is detected. In outcome-based detection, errors are 
detected based on the undesired or unanticipated 
consequence of the action. Outcome-based detection is the 
most frequently occurring form of detection. In aviation, it 
may not be until a runway incursion has occurred that the 
initial error in flight operations has been detected. The third 
form of detection is referred to as limiting hc t ion  
detection. In the case of limiting function detection, errors 
are caught because the error has created a situation in the 
physical environment in which further action is not possible. 
In low altitude, high speed flight, free time is very limited. 
An error may create a CFlT accident. Due to limited free 
time, avoidance of the accident is impossible. Last, errors 
can be undetected. Sellen defines undetected emors as those 
that are detected, but by someone other than the actor. This 
is the second most prevalent form of error detection. In 
aviation, an error may be detected by a member of the flight 
crew other than the pilot, or by ATC. Overall, Sellen (1 994) 
provides a fundamental framework for categorizing error 
detection, based upon actual empirical information. 
In a similar vein, Sarter and Alexander (2000) also 
examined how errors were detected in the aviation domain. 
In a majority of the cases, the error was not caught by the 
aircrew or by the individual committing the error, but rather 
by ATC (52.7%). In the 43% of cases where the error was 
detected by a crew member, a majority of the time the error 
was detected by the person who committed the error. 
Results of this study underlie the need to study error 
detection further. Specifically, in the aviation domain, error 
detection needs to be studied as it relates to group action, 
and how it occurs in complex and dynamic environments. 
The remainder of this paper will explore threat and 
error detection in much greater detail, focusing on 
physiological, emotional and cognitive elements associated 
with the process of detection. This project is meant to be a 
blueprint for understanding the process of error and threat 
detection, providing researchers with potential avenues for 
future inquiry. 
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Physiological and Emotional Correlates of Threat 
Detection 
Threat detection can be broken down into three 
fbndamental modules, physiology, emotion, and cognition. 
Although each one has their own separate processes, they 
are all linked through the structures in the brain. 
Physiological psychologists describe human cognition using 
a network model. Knowledge structures are stored in 
memory as nodes that are linked to each other based on 
strong associations. When certain memories are triggered, 
other memories that are strongly associated with the original 
memory may also be triggered. In threat detection, emotion 
strengthens the associations. Events,or objects are perceived 
as more threatening if they are associated with negative 
emotions. The neural networks that tie emotion into 
cognition include a direct connection to the brain's primary 
motivational systems (Lang, Davis, & Ohrnan, 2000). These 
motivational systems are driven by appetitive (positive) and 
adverse (negative) stimuli. Adverse stimuli trigger fear 
within the brain's defense mechanisms that help identify the 
stimuli as threatening. It has been found that functional 
activation in the occipital cortex was more extensive when 
the arousal stimuli included such things as scenes of violent 
deaths, threats, and erotica (Bradley, Sabatinelli, Lang, 
Fitzsimmons, King, & Desai, 2003). This shows that 
arousing stimuli create a longer activation of the visual or 
occipital cortex, which in turn creates a motivated attention 
toward the threat, and facilitates the processing of the 
adverse stimuli (Bradley, Sabatinelli, Lang, Fitzsimmons, 
King, & Desai, 2003). 
The term "fight or flight" has been used to describe 
the physiological and psychological response to a threat that 
is automatic and involuntary (Ratey, 200 1). W i g  "fight or 
flight", the brain stem will release increased quantities of 
norepinephrine, which in turn causes the adrenal glands to 
release more adrenaline. An increase in adrenaline causes 
faster heart rate, pulse rate, and respiration rate. There is 
also, shunting of the blood to more vital areas, and release 
of blood sugar, lactic acid and other chemicals, all of which 
are involved in readying one for fighting the danger, or 
running away from the threat. Feelings of dread, fear, 
impending doom, are also common. Threat triggers various 
physiological reactions that help us cope with a dangerous 
situation. These reactions give humans the change to fight 
or escape. 
Physiology and Error Detection 
In contrast to threat detection, error detection is 
much more cognitively influenced and is more associated 
with the monitoring systems of the brain. These monitoring 
systems compare correct performance and the current 
performance at the same time causing a negative event 
related potential (ERP) 80ms after the response (Ullsperger, 
Yves von Cramen, & Muller, 2002). The anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), which is associated with attentional and 
cognitive control has been shown to be activated during 
error detection (Van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & 
Carter, 2001). Van Veen, et al. found that the ACC 
"contributes to executive functions through the detection of 
conflicts occurring at later or response-related levels of 
processing" (pg. 1302). The lateral prefiontal cortex has also 
been shown to assist in responding to conflicts and 
interference and helping the ACC with performance 
monitoring. 
Future studies may help to link threat and error detection 
through the biological makeup of the brain. Error detection 
utilizes the monitoring systems of the brain to compare 
current situations and the correct actions to detect a possible 
negative consequence. These errors create negative even 
related potentials in the cingulated motor area of the anterior 
cingulated cortex. The monitoring system is spread out 
between the anterior cingulated cortex, and the lateral 
prefrontal cortex. 
A review of physiological functioning indicates 
that the brain is a very complex structure housing cognition, 
behavior and emotions. Our bodies can react to a threat 
without being consciously aware of the stimulus, while at 
the same time, the brain's cognitive structures can be 
activated in order to take the correct action to alleviate the 
threat. Reactions to threat, such as affect, startle, and 
freezing, help to imbed the memory of the event into a 
linked network to assist in future threat detection. Emotion 
creates a motivated attention that stimulates the sensory 
regions of the brain, which in turn increases the organism's 
fine tune scanning abilities. Most research identifies the 
difference between threat and error detection through the 
presence or absence of emotion. Emotion and motivated 
attention are more highly associated with threat detection 
than with error detection. In contrast, error detection occurs 
primarily in the cortical areas of brain. Areas of brain 
activation associated with threat and error detection are 
presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure I. 
Brain activation associated with threat detection and error detection. 
Cognitive Aspects o f E m r  and Threat Detection 
It should be noted that much of the following 
section discusses cognitive aspects ofthreat detection, rather 
than error detection. This is due to the fact that little 
research has focused on error detection, while attending to 
and acting on threats has been a priority of many aviation 
researchers. In the works described, e m  is 0 t h  assumed 
to be a precursor of threat, such that a focus on error is one 
of reduction or elimination, rather than simple detection. 
Tomaka, Kibler, Blascovich & Ernst (1997) 
categorize appraisal of a situation as critical in determining 
its threat level. Furthermore they divide the appraisal 
process into two components, threat and challenge. Tomaka 
et al. believe that when a situation is perceived as falling 
within the person's resources, the task is labeled as 
challenging. When the task exceeds the personal resources, 
it becomes a threat. This interpretive bias reflects the 
importance of the availability of cues that help humans 
determine if a situation should be label a threat or a 
challenge. 
Warnings are important aids to facilitate appraisal 
of a situation. Frequently, warnings are added into user 
interfaces to help improve usability, increase efficiency and 
lower attentional demand. However, low attentional 
demands create sensory adaptations and individuals cease to 
respond to non-valid warnings if the hquency of their 
occurrence is high. This is called the cry-wolf effect (Maltz 
and Meyer, 2001). The probability that a warning will 
actually predict that danger will occur is called the positive 
predictive value (PPV). Research on warnings tends to 
follow the ideas of signal detection theory. Signal detection 
theory involves determining the threshold of a person's 
ability to detect the correct stimulus fiom background noise. 
Researchers look at the hits, misses, and false alarms of the 
participants and determine at what level individuals go 
beyond optimal appraisal and responding, and begin making 
e m .  
Rozelle and Baxter (1975) also showed that 
appraisal of potentially threatening situations can be also 
based on the integration of contextual cues and dispositional 
traits of the individuals involved. This research found that 
police officers used contextual cues to infer the presence of 
danger to a greater extend then dispositional cues. However, 
this tendency was reversed for situations in which the 
situation indicated that the potential for danger was low. 
Experience of the officer also correlated with decision- 
making. Experienced police officers were more likely to 
use integrative decision-making focused on both contextual 
determinants of behavior and enduring personality traits of 
the target individual. Less experienced police officers made 
appraisals based primarily on personality or perceived 
dispositional characteristics of the target. 
Situation awareness. and threat. Perhaps the most 
valuable way to explain the role of cognition in threat and 
error detection is through the idea of situation awareness. 
Situation awareness (SA) has become a buzzword in recent 
time and has been used in all sorts of domains. Its prime use 
has been in aviation. In order to measure situation 
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awareness, it needs to be broken down into fundamental 
principles and problems. Endsley (1995) defines situation 
awareness as the ''perception of the stimuli of the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the 
comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their 
behavior in the near future (pg. 36)." This means that pilots 
first has to perceive the stimuli around them using their 
senses, then comprehend their meaning, significance, or 
danger, and finally predict how the stimuli will react. Each 
of these processes need to be improved in order to enhance 
situation awareness. 
This definition of SA does not represent all of the 
individual's knowledge but just pf that of the dynamic 
environment (Endsley, 1995). Environmental features are 
initially processed in parallel through pre-attentive sensory 
stores in which certain properties are detected. These 
properties include spatial proximity, color, simple shapes, 
and movement. The objects that stand out the most will be 
further processed using focalized attention, reflecting the 
importance of cue salience. Attention is a major element in 
perceiving and processing cues for threat detection and 
responke. In complex and dynamic environments, 
information overload and multiple tasks can put a strain on 
a person's attention capabilities. 
Errors in SA during action selection can degrade 
the decision making process (Endsley, 1995). SA involves 
using mental models, prior knowledge, schema, and 
reasoning in making decisions. Acquiring and maintaining 
the attentional and conceptual processes that facilitate SA 
involves significant cognitive resources. Acquiring and 
maintaining SA should be thought of as an integral part of 
an individual's workload and repertoire. 
SA is broken up into the process and the product. 
"The product refers to the state of awareness in terns of 
information and knowledge, while the process refers to the 
various perceptual and cognitive activities involved in 
constructing updating and revising the state of awareness 
(Adams, Teney, & Pew, 1995, pg. 88)". Although both are 
individually important, they can't work without each other. 
If environmental cues are ignored (process) it could be that 
these cues were not part of awareness (product). 
It is very important to have some sort of 
knowledge base of the situation when detecting a threat. 
This knowledge is organized in the form of a mental model 
or a schema to help anticipate information and is stored in 
long-term memory. A mental model is a cognitive 
h e w o r k  cognitively designed by a person to generate 
explanations of a situations or systems purpose and function. 
It is this mental model that allows an individual to help 
make predictions about how the environment will react 
(Smith, and Hancock, 1995). The ability to think ahead is a 
very important part of situational awareness in aviation and 
threat detection in general (Adams, Teney, & Pew, 1995). 
Problems in threat detection can then arise when the 
environment defies critical cognitive functions such as 
activation of mental models, and may include situations 
where critical information is not available, it takes too long 
to execute a task or attention is directed elsewhere. If an 
individual fails to develop a mental model for a particular 
situation, then helshe will fail to detect the threat even 
though the situation may be familiar (Endsley, 1995). 
Workload and threat. Within aviation, pilots are 
required to attend to many knowledge intensive and 
procedurally complex tasks all at one time. This limits the 
attention that can be devoted to scan for threats. These 
multitasking demands can cause pilots to initiate errors 
because of the high task load and cognitive demands on 
memory. In a study done by Jones and Endsley (1 996), it 
was found that high cognitive workload caused 30% off all 
situation awareness errors and 35% of those people couldn't 
pick out threat cues that were clearly present. In a research 
example, Gugerty (1997) tested driver's knowledge of 
surrounding cars with direct recall and indirect performance 
measures. They found that a driver's knowledge of nearby 
cars is largely explicit and not implicit, meaning that they 
know where the cars are through experience and active 
rehearsal, and not through untraceable knowledge. When 
there were too many cars to track, the drivers used cues to 
focus on cars that might have been a threat. Gugerty also 
found that drivers remembered the location of hazardous 
cars better when they were driving than when they were in 
the passenger seat. 
One factor that alleviates the negative effects of 
high workload is experience (Adams, Tenney, & Pew, 
1995). With greater expertise one is better able to direct 
attention to threat cues that are important. Expertise 
facilitates decision-making and developing accurate 
expectations about future events. As a result of enhanced 
cognitive processing, expertise in a situation can help to 
reduce workload and make an individual better prepared to 
accurately detect and assess threat. It has been shown that 
experts have highly developed management and planning 
skills that help them perform efficiently (Adams, Tenney, & 
Pew, 1995). In aviation, expert pilots would then use 
experience and procedural knowledge in their judgments, 
while avoiding the use of less reliable heuristics to 
determine level of threat and plan present and future 
behaviors. 
Threat detection and suatial awareness. The 
efficiency of one's spatial awareness is also important in 
determining a threat. Pilots, astronauts, and submariners 
possibly have the most spatially tasking jobs in the world. 
Each profession has to move a craft in a three dimensional 
space that is filled with hazards. Besides maintaining the 
orientation of the craft, the pilots must navigate the vehicle 
to the proper waypoints (Wickens, 2002). Spatial awareness 
needs to be heightened in order to make the environmental 
cues used for threat detection more accessible to the pilot. 
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Wickens (2002) describes three issues in display design for 
spatial awareness. The " h e  of reference" issue concerns 
whether information should be presented from the pilot's 
h e  of reference (egocentric) or fiom a world view 
(exocentric). These are usually termed inside-out and 
outside-in respectively. An inside-out display involves the 
cmft moving on a stationary world. An outside-in display 
involved a stationary craft with the world moving around it. 
Wickens (2002) argues that the type of display should 
depend on the task and the user. Egocentric views are good 
for flight control and tracking. Exocentric views are good 
for threat detection. These exocentric displays are usually 
depicting the airplane fiom behind and aboye. The second 
issue (degree of integration) is concerned with whether it is 
better to use a 3D display of motion or a 2D display of 
motion. 3D motion creates an ambiguity to locating the 
objects in space and 2D motion creates more attentional 
demands and cognitive loads on the individual. The third 
issue (prediction) is important to be able to determine what 
will happen in the future. Displays should help the pilot 
cope with lag time and be useful in controlling the craft. The 
display needs to show where the craft will be in a certain 
amount of time or after an input. Current technology on this 
issue is limited because many factors predict what will 
happen to the craft. A display that channels attention to the 
forward flight path inhibits attention to surrounding threats, 
even if they are displayed elsewhere in the cockpit. This 
means in addition to a good display the pilot needs to have 
good task management skills, allocate attention to sources 
of information for performance, and anticipate unexpected 
events in the environment. 
Tlrreat and Error Management 
While detecting threats and errors is extremely 
important, action still needs to follow detection. Knowing 
how to manage a threat and/or error is very important in 
creating effective cockpit operations and eliminating fatal 
accidents. While error doesn't create an outburst ofemotion, 
threat is driven by emotion. Threats create an increase in 
anxiety and arousal. Learning how to cope with threat is 
important in helping to decrease anxiety, and stress, while 
increasing performance. William Glasser (1 989) developed 
a theory called choice theory in which he believed that the 
only behavior that can be controlled is one's own. We 
always have choice or control over our own lives and 
behaviors. This concept is key to controlling threats. 
Solomon, Holmes, & McCaul (1980) found that when 
participants exercised control over a threat it reduced 
anxiety. This was found only when the control was easy to 
execute. In kt, just knowing that they may be able to 
control the threat decreased participants' anxiety levels 
while anticipating the threat. The problem is that difficult 
methods of control actually create more anxiety. 
In aviation, crew resource management (CRM) can 
be thought of as an error management or error 
countermeasure system. CRM helps avoid, trap, and reduce 
the consequences of errors, thus also eliminating the need 
for threat detection (Helmreich, Memtt, & Wilhelm, (1 999). 
Errors can be reduced by creating proper checklists, 
fostering active communication and monitoring skills, and 
understanding the sources of the error. CRM can help 
convince the crew that errors are unavoidable, but by 
understanding human cognition and limitations, errors can 
be reduced. CRM can effectively teach the crew how to 
cope with stress, which in turn allows them to deal with 
threats. CRM has been developed into advanced 
qualification programs (AQP) that are designed by each 
airline to meet their standards and regulations. In AQP 
programs, training is presented in realistic environments to 
put flightcrews in realistic situations with simulated 
stressors, and the potential for errors and threat detection to 
occur. 
DISCUSSION 
It is clear from the review of the literature that 
threat and error detection is a complex process involving 
cognitive, physiological and emotional components. Figure 
1 provides a flow chart with topic linkages related to error 
and threat detection. However complex, certain conclusions 
can be drawn from this literature and recommendations can 
be made about optimizing threat and error detection in 
aviation. 
First, it is evident that humans are not very good at 
detecting error (Sellen, 1994), especially errors that are 
small and have no immediate effects on the working 
environment. When an error is detected, it is often 
recognized by someone other than the individual initiating 
the error. In aviation, air traffic control is the most frequent 
detector of errors, following by the individual committing 
the error and hislher crew members (Sarter & Alexander, 
2000). 
Second, we know that error and threat detection 
comprise two different processes. Error detection occurs 
primarily in the coritcal centers of the brain, while threat 
detection involves the limbic and reticular activating 
systems, indicating a large emotional component in that 
process. Error detection requires cognitive attention and 
focused awareness of the operator. When errors accumulate 
or the situation becomes more unsafe, as in the case of 
catastrophic safety problems, the threat detection system 
takes over and creates immediate awareness. Unfortunately, 
the emotional component of threat detection necessary for 
immediate physical activation also carries inherent faults in 
that over-arousal in humans is associated with impaired 
performance and cognitive judgment. 
Aviation has always been concerned with 
increasing safety. To that end, many systems have been 
automated with built-in protections that alert users to 
potential threats and errors. Some of these systems even 
provide solutions to identified threats. However, it will be 
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many years, if ever, that the human will be completely taken 
out of the cockpit. Until that time, aviation researches and 
practitioners also need to consider ways to enhance human 
error and threat detection in aviation environments. Given 
known limitations of human error and threat detection 
systems, what suggestions can be made to enhance error and 
threat awareness in aviation? 
The fmt recommendation that can be made is to 
create an error awareness culture that diffuses responsibility 
for error detection and reporting across the entire work team 
or aircrew. Research has shown that error detection often 
does not come fiom the operator, but from a fellow crew 
member or air traffic control. Error ,detection then becomes 
everyone's business. Reporting the small errors that are 
inevitable in aviation operations, as indicated via the LOSA 
system, must be mandatory and result not in punishment, but 
in a show of support for safe crew operations. 
Second, aircrews must engage in extensive and 
ongoing training for increases in expertise. The literature is 
clear that domain experts are better able to recognize error, 
and they do so sooner than novices or trained novices. Not 
only are they better at recognizing errors, they are better 
able to respond to and cope with threatening situations 
incurred by the errors. Therefore, employing pilots and 
crewmembers with higher levels of expertise is important. 
Norman (1998) estimates that expertise does not occur until 
an individual has 5,000 hours or 10 years of domain-specific 
experience. This is not a small amount of time or effort. If 
this is the case, continued training of new pilots and flight 
attendants is crucial to bring those crewmembers to a level 
of expertise more quickly. LOSA actually should contribute 
to the training process and development of expertise. The 
safety audits done in LOSA should make aircrew members 
more knowledgeable about their own behaviors in the 
cockpit, the types of errors committed in the course of daily 
operation, and how to prevent these errors in the future. 
Increases in knowledge as a result of LOSA should 
contribute to schema change and enrichment, resulting in 
lasting performance gains. 
Next, although this may be difficult, it is important 
to begin to develop training in the areas of prospective 
memory and extrapolation of current events into the future. 
Prospective memory refers to the process by which memory 
is sustained over long periods of time, requiring humans to 
remember to engage in actions in the future. In the absence 
of memory cues, humans are not good at prospective 
memory tasks, often forgetting to complete a cycle of 
activity or to engage in a necessary task at the right time or 
place. This may not only contribute to the accumulation of 
error in flight operations, but can be disasttous. 
Part of development of prospective awareness 
skills will also involve development of knowledge about 
extrapolating fiom present events into the future. Again, 
human are weak in identifLing the longterm impact of 
current actions or events. This weakness is well-elaborated 
by Edward Tenner (1996), who writes about revenge effects 
in the development of products and solutions geared toward 
aiding human existence. For example, the infant walker, 
designed to aid babies in development of walking skills, 
actually had the longterm effect of delaying crawling and 
walking in infants by a month or more. In aviation, a small 
error made early in a flight may not have a long term effect 
at all, or the effect may be delayed for hours, days or 
months. If the operator of the system cannot extrapolate the 
potential results of a small error, then the system itself 
becomes faulty and unsafe. 
Thus, it is absolutely necessary to teach pilots and 
crewmembers how to think about problem solving in both 
a short term and long term manner. Using the concepts of 
situation awareness (SA) may facilitate this process. 
Situation awareness has components of both present and 
future action. The key is to focus on training for future 
awareness, probably the least elucidated part of the SA 
perspective. Training for future knowledge, analysis and 
decision-making is an area that is ripe for intensive study 
and development of training strategies. 
Last, although training in aviation and the safety 
culture it engenders is quite advanced, research and 
development about error and threat detection is necessary to 
advance aviation safety to a new standard. Aviation is the 
safest form of transportation, however every accident can 
cost hundreds of lives and millions of dollars. Development 
of techniques to increase aircrews' awareness of error and 
threat would further limit the repercussions of aviation 
accidents. This report has attempted to create a state of the 
art review of what we currently know about error and threat 
detection. It is hoped that aviation researchers and 
organizations take this knowledge and use it to create an 
even safer flying environment in the future. To better serve 
future researchers in this area, Figure 2 provides a list of 
potential research areas directly related to error and threat 
detection. It is critical that researchers and practitioners in 
the field of aviation utilize this information to provide a 
more complete picture of how human detect and manage 
error and threat. 
This research was funded through a faculty 
research grant from the Office of the Vice-Provost for 
Research, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. .) 
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